By contrast, US allies and partners are prepared to resist Chinese aggression and expect that the US would help frustrate any Chinese bid for regional hegemony. But in the case of Ukraine, NATO allies are not prepared to defend against a Russian attack and are not expecting the US to do so. In both instances, geography works against US military options, and in neither is the US bound by an ironclad security commitment.
This did not constitute a NATO-like security commitment, but it did imply that Ukraine would not be abandoned.Īnd yet some who oppose direct resistance of Russian aggression against Ukraine support it in the case of possible Chinese aggression against Taiwan. The US and the United Kingdom, along with Russia itself, provided assurances to Ukraine in 1994 that, in exchange for giving up the nuclear arsenal it had inherited from the Soviet Union, its sovereignty and borders would be respected. To receive your print copy, delivered wherever you are in the world, subscribe to PS for less than $9 a month.Īs a PS subscriber, you’ll also enjoy unlimited access to our On Point suite of premium long-form content, Say More contributor interviews, The Big Picture topical collections, and the full PS archive.īut Biden is also right to push back against Russia. Our newest magazine, The Year Ahead 2022: Reckonings, is here. Biden was right to take direct US military intervention off the table: not acting on such a threat would only reinforce mounting doubts as to America’s reliability. But geography and military balance make direct defense of Ukraine all but impossible. Some have criticized the US response as too weak. The objective is to persuade Russia not to invade by making clear that the costs would outweigh any benefits and that some Russian concerns could be addressed, at least in part, if it backed off. US President Joe Biden’s administration has reacted to Russia’s troop buildup with a mix of honey and vinegar. Invasion led to conquest, and it took a massive international coalition led by the United States to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore the country’s sovereignty.Ĭould a similar dynamic be playing out today on the Russia-Ukraine border? Bush not to overreact, convinced it was a ploy to compel Kuwait to take steps to increase the price of oil, which would help Iraq recover and rearm after its long war with Iran.īy early August, though, what to many had looked like political theater had become all too real. Arab leaders told then-US President George H.W. Then, as now, intentions were murky but the imbalance of forces was obvious. What comes to mind is July 1990, when another autocrat, Saddam Hussein, positioned sizable military forces along Iraq’s southern border with Kuwait.
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